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Available online 5 January 2017AbstractThis study tests the validity of the free cash flow hypothesis in the context of firms traded on Borsa Istanbul. The study applies a panel
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Instances of corruption and bankruptcies have brought
agency theory to the forefront in recent years. Agency theory
contends that conflict often exists between the interests of
shareholders and those of managers. Free cash flow is one of
the tools managers use to promote their personal interests, and
the problem of reining it in is of equal interest to academics,
regulatory bodies and companies.
Agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) serves as a
theoretical basis for the free cash flow hypothesis (Jensen,
1986, 1989, 1993), which argues that managers use free
cash flow to invest in projects with negative net present value
(NPV) even when these investments is not at the interests of
shareholders. According to the free cash flow hypothesis,
managers may be reluctant to debt financing or pay out divi-
dends, as these moves reduce free cash flow in their hands.
However, that is precisely the reason these moves can stem the* Corresponding author.
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hands of managers.
While definitive results have yet to be obtained, the studies
of Rozeff (1982) and Easterbrook (1984), DeAngelo and
DeAngelo (2000), and La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer,
and Vishny (2000) have reached conclusions supporting the
free cash flow hypothesis. Denis, Denis, and Sarin (1994) have
also reached similar findings. Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004) and
Fairfield, Whisenant, and Yohn (2003) uncovered poor share
performance among firms making extreme amounts of in-
vestment. Similarly, Dechow, Richardson, and Sloan (2008)
proposed that firms with excessive amounts of free cash flow
have low future performance. Lang, Ofek, and Stulz (1996)
suggested that indebtedness reduced free cash flow at firms
with low Tobin's Q ratios. Li and Cui (2003), Byrd (2010),
Khan, Kaleem, and Nazir (2012), and Zhang (2009) also
reached similar conclusions.
In Turkey, as in many developed financial markets, prin-
cipals of corporate governance are being put into practice in
order to reduce agency cost stemming from the agency prob-
lem. In 2003 corporate governance principals made their debut
in Turkey with the “comply or explain” approach. In 2012 they
became compliance rules and achieved the status of law withting by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
112 E. Kadioglu, E.A. Yilmaz / Borsa _Istanbul Review 17-2 (2017) 111e116the introduction of the Capital Markets Law at the beginning
2013. Similarly, corporate governance principals are partly
seen in the Turkish Commercial Code of 2012. Given the
importance of corporate governance in Turkey, it should be
investigated as to whether the regulations fit a theoretical
framework as well as whether they achieve their goals. This
study aims to shed light on the relationship between dividend
distribution and free cash flow, in particular. Similarly, the
effect of external financing upon free cash flow should be
investigated. The results may guide to corporate governance
regulations and practices in Turkey.
Even though there are many studies in Turkey related to
corporate governance and firm performance or dividend policy
and corporate governance or capital structure and firm per-
formance, we couldn't find a study directly testing free cash
flow hypothesis or testing relationship between free cash flow
and dividend or leverage in the context of agency cost or
corporate governance.
This study investigates whether the free cash flow hy-
pothesis is valid for firms traded on Borsa Istanbul using the
IFRS yearly nonconsolidated balance sheets and income
statements of 227 firms for the period 2008e2014. A panel
regression is used to test for a relation between free cash flow
and the variables dividends per share, debt ratio and total
assets.
According to the results of the panel regression, a statisti-
cally significant, negative relation exists between dividends
per share and free cash flow as well as debt ratio and free cash
flow. In addition, total assets and free cash flow have a sig-
nificant, positive correlation. These relations are still valid,
when the crisis year 2008 and 2009 excluded from the anal-
ysis. Thus, the results support the free cash flow hypothesis.
As the hypothesis suggests, dividend distribution and debt
financing reduce free cash flow. In other words, firms with
high dividend distribution or high debt ratios have a lower
amount of free cash flow in the hands of managers.
Section 2 of the study provides an overview of the relevant
literature. Section 3 outlines the data and methodology while
Section 4 presents the results and their implications. Finally,
Section 5 summarizes the conclusions of the study.
2. Literature review
At the heart of the free cash flow hypothesis proposed by
Jensen (1986, 1989, 1993) lies the agency problem (Jensen &
Meckling, 1976), defined as the divergence of the interests of
managers from those of shareholders. Richardson (2006)
defined free cash flow as possession of cash outside that
used for asset maintenance and the finance of new in-
vestments. Chen, Hope, Li, and Wang (2011) found free cash
flow to be an indicator of overinvestment.
According to the free cash flow hypothesis, managers are
able to manipulate free cash flow under their control. As these
managers do not want to go under threat of bankrupt, they are
reluctant to pay out dividends or debt financing. Similarly,
they do not look favorably on using external capital, being
unwilling to bear the scrutiny of lenders or shareholders.Excessive free cash flow in the hands of managers leads to
overinvestment due to investment in projects with negative net
present value (Jensen, 1986; Jensen &Meckling, 1976). While
this reduces profitability and company worth, it helps man-
agers to control a greater amount of wealth or assets. Ac-
cording to this hypothesis, managers of firms with a high
amount of free cash flow avoid market checks. These man-
agers do not feel the need for external funds for investments or
expenditures; therefore, they are not subjected to the investi-
gation or regulation of lenders or shareholders. In the event
that funds are provided by capital markets; ample, detailed
information needs to be shared with market participants and
more these bring more questions that have to be answered by
the managers. Rubin (1990) and Lang, Stulz, and Walkling
(1991) argued that managers prefer to use any free cash flow
remaining after investment negative-NPV projects to continue
to invest in such projects rather than pay out dividends.
Apart from using free cash flow to invest in projects with
negative NPV, managers tend to make unnecessary expenditures
aligned with their personal interests. Tangible or intangible as-
sets unrelated to company operations may be purchased in the
firm's name, but function purely for a manager's personal use.
According to La Porta et al. (2000), overinvestment and personal
expenditures are seen even in environments with stricter investor
protections. Acquiring firms that are not feasible investments is
also seen more frequently at firms with greater free cash flow
(Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, &Williamson, 1999).
According to Christie and Zimmerman (1991), paying out
dividends is helpful for reducing free cash flow in the hands of
company managers as well as reducing agency cost. They
found that, as a result, dividends help check managers and
create a discipline mechanism without the direct intervention
of shareholders. The reduction of free cash free cash flow in
managers' control was found to reduce agency cost and raise
company worth (Park & Jang, 2013). Similarly, securing
outside capital was found to bring overinvestment problems
under control. The payment of interest upon debts reduces the
amount of free cash flow in the hands of managers.
While studies have yet to offer definitive results, the find-
ings of Rozeff (1982) and Easterbrook (1984) support the free
cash flow hypothesis. According to these researchers, paying
greater dividends can reduce firms' agency costs. As firms
paying high dividends are financed more often by the market,
they are subject to closer scrutiny. DeAngelo and DeAngelo
(2000) and La Porta et al. (2000) also reached similar con-
clusions. However, Denis et al. (1994) did not obtain results
supporting this hypothesis.
Brush, Bromiley, and Hendrickx (2000) found that free
cash flow negatively impacted growth while Titman et al.
(2004) and Fairfield et al. (2003) found a much lower stock
performance among firms with overinvestment problems.
Similarly, Dechow et al. (2008) proposed that firms with
excessive free cash flow had a lower future performance.
Lang et al. (1996) suggested that higher debt ratios reduced
free cash flow at firms with low Tobin's Q ratios. Similar
findings were obtained by Li and Cui (2003), Byrd (2010),
Khan et al. (2012), Fatma (2011) and Zhang (2009).
Table 2
Variables used in the study.
Variables Type Formulation
DPS Independent Cash dividends paid out/number of outstanding
shares
LEV Independent Total debt/total assets
LTLEV Independent Long-term debt/total debt
SIZE Controlling
independent
Ln (total assets)
FCF Dependent (Operating net income þ depreciation
expenses  corporate income tax  interest
expenses  cash dividends)/total assets
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corporate governance and firm performance (Baykut, 2013;
Çarıkçı, Kalaycı, & G€ok, 2009; Dagli, Ayaydin, &
Eyu¨boglu, 2010; Ersoy, Bayrakdaroglu, & S¸amiloglu, 2011;
Kalmıs‚ & Yavuzaslan, 2016; Karakoç, Tayyar, & Erhan,
2016; Karamustafa, Varıcı, & Er, 2009; Tas‚kırmaz & Bal,
2016; _Ilhan, Topaloglu, & €Ozyamanoglu, 2013) or dividend
policy and corporate governance (Aydin & Cavdar, 2015;
Gu¨rbu¨z, Aybars, & Kutlu, 2010; Mazgit, 2013; Mitton,
2004) or capital structure and firm performance (Atmaca,
2012; Bayrakdaroglu, 2010; Dogan, 2013), we couldn't find
a study directly testing free cash flow hypothesis or testing
relationship between free cash flow and dividend or leverage
in the context of agency cost or corporate governance.
3. Data and methodology3.1. DataTable 3
Descriptive statistics of variables.
DPS FCF SIZE LEV LTLEV
Mean 17.87061 0.007971 0.432773 0.241405 18.09192
Median 0.000000 0.023275 0.392071 0.170003 18.16021
Maximum 1922.000 0.469173 14.57242 0.997912 23.42821
Minimum 0.000000 1.314418 4.30E-05 0.000000 13.41040
Std. Dev. 99.74138 0.143423 0.562684 0.231729 1.700857
Skewness 11.33217 3.541192 14.50943 1.086475 0.055353
Kurtosis 167.4381 26.39353 334.8442 3.386520 2.576064
Observations 1267 1267 1267 1267 1267This study used the IFRS yearly nonconsolidated balance
sheets and income statements of 227 firms traded on Borsa
Istanbul for the period 2008e2014. This data is obtained from
the financial data network Finnet.
Table 1 shows the main indicator of main indicators of the
companies listed in Borsa Istanbul in 2008e2014. The table
also gives information about total paid cash dividend, total
assets and total equity of the companies that are used in this
study.
As seen from Table 1, nearly half of the listed companies
are included the sample. During the period of 2008e2014
nominal capital increased by 65% and market capitalization
increased by 3.43 times. According to our sample the ratio
cash dividend paid out to total equity is around 4%.
The study follows company performance over a period of
maximum 7 years, minimum 3 years and an average of 5.6
years. For years in which dividends were not paid out, the
dividend rate per share is considered 0. The free cash flow
(FCF ) variable used in the regression is normalized by total
assets in order to achieve comparable results.
Table 2 lists the variables used in the study as calculated
using the items from company balance sheets and income
statements.Table 1
Main indicator of the listed companies and sample.
Year Main Indicators all listed firms Ma
No. of firms Total nominal capital
(million TL)
Market capitalization
(million TL)
No
2008 326 63,300 182,025 161
2009 325 70,061 350,761 181
2010 350 80,806 472,553 195
2011 373 89,274 381,152 203
2012 395 96,634 550,051 191
2013 405 103,179 503,668 174
2014 401 104,540 624,369 162
Sources: www.spk.gov.tr and www.borsaistanbul.com.Table 3 summarizes the descriptive statistics for all vari-
ables. Table 3 gives the mean, median, maximum, minimum,
standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis values of the vari-
ables used in study.
In order to see the degree of the relation of the variables, a
correlation matrix is reported in Table 4. As seen from Table 4,
there are low correlations between variables. The highest
relation is between size (in terms total assets) and dividend per
share. The correlation between DPS and SIZE, 0.135, is at
acceptable level.3.2. MethodologyThis study investigates whether the free cash flow hy-
pothesis is valid in the context of Borsa Istanbul. According to
the free cash flow hypothesis, high debt rations and/or high
dividend payouts reduce the amount of free cash flow in the
hands of managers, thus, reducing agency cost and helping toin Indicators of firms used in analysis
. of firms Total assets
(million TL)
Total equity
(million TL)
Total cash dividend paid out
(million TL)
36,138 17,096 826
38,929 18,947 507
45,175 21,698 561
56,653 27,912 985
59,361 30,721 1583
66,134 33,219 1361
66,868 32,136 1695
Table 4
Correlations between variables.
DPS LEV UVLEV SIZE
DPS 1 0.036318 0.025810 0.13505
LEV 0.03631 1 0.021134 0.08606
LTLEV 0.02581 0.021134 1 0.09032
SIZE 0.13505 0.086067 0.09032 1
Table 5
Results of unit root tests.
Levin, Lin &
Chu t
Im, Pesaran and
Shin w-stat
ADF e Fisher
chi-square
FCF Stat 55.33 26.66 871.027
Prob. 0.00 0.00 0.00
DPS Stat 68.37 11.47 151.375
Prob. 0.00 0.00 0.00
D(SIZE) Stat 60.65 16.29 644.98
Prob. 0.00 0.00 0.00
LEV Stat 67.45 13.13 576.45
Prob. 0.00 0.00 0.00
LTLEV Stat 28.87 5.70 466.21
Prob. 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: The variable SIZE has unit root at the level. We took the first difference
to remove unit root. D shows the first difference.
Table 6
Results of fixed-effects panel regression for all period and non-crisis period.
Variable Whole Period (2008e2014) Non-Crisis Period (2010e2014)
Coefficient T-statistics Coefficient T-statistics
Constant 0.044011 5.72* 0.076109 7.63*
DPS 0.000158 3.17* 0.000109 2.16**
LEV 0.051383 4.54* 0.145482 7.68*
LTLEV 0.032645 1.65** 0.020373 1.046
D(SIZE) 0.046269 5.47* 0.042405 5.19*
F-statistics 4.52* 4.73*
Adj R2 0.44 0.49
Notes: * indicates a statistical significance of 1% and ** indicates a statistical
significance of 1%. As the data are unbalanced, the two-way random-effects
model could not be run due to missing data. In the one-way random-effects
model, Hausman test favors the fixed effects model.
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shareholders. This study tests whether a significant, negative
correlation exists between free cash flow and debt ratios as
well as free cash flow and dividend payouts in Borsa Istanbul.
Assuming that free cash flow leads to overinvestment as per
the hypothesis, the study also investigates whether a positive
correlation exists between free cash flow and total assets in the
same context.
This study uses the undistributed cash flow method to
calculate free cash flow. This method was also used by Lehn
and Poulsen (1989), Lang et al. (1991), Wells, Cox, and
Gaver (1995), Gul and Tsui (1997), Chu (2011), Wu (2004),
Wang (2010), Hong, Shuting, and Meng (2012), and Al-
Azzawi and Zararee (2014). Some studies have normalized
free cash flow with sales while others have done so using total
assets. This study uses the total asset for normalizing free cash
flow.
The relationship between free cash flow and dividends per
share, debt ratios, long-term debt ratios and total assets is
investigated in the context of the free cash flow hypothesis.
The equation below is applied using a panel regression to the
data of 227 firms traded on Borsa Istanbul for the period
2008e2014. Sarayloo and Sarafi (2016), Khan et al. (2012),
Wells et al. (1995), Kargar and Ahmadi (2013) used similar
forms of the equation below to test the variables listed above
in varying combinations.
FCFi ¼ aþ b1DPSi þ b2LEVi þ b3LTLEViþ b4SIZEi þ εi
The values of the variables in the equation above are as
follows:
 FCF: Free cash flow/total assets
 DPS: Dividends per share
 LEV: Total debt/total assets
 LTLEV: Long-term debt/total debt
 SIZE: Total asset logarithm
This study uses the following hypotheses to test the free
cash flow hypothesis:
 H1: Dividend payout ratio has negative, significant effect
on free cash flow
 H2: Firm's leverage has negative, significant influence on
free cash flow
 H3: Firm's long-term leverage has negative, significant
influence on free cash flow
 H4: Positive correlation between free cash flow and total
assets4. Results
Studies based on time series data assume that the under-
lying time series are stationary. However, time series in
finance are typically non-stationary or, in other terms, they
contain a unit root. Some researchers argue that using non-
stationary data may result in a highly autocorrelated re-
siduals with low DurbineWatson statistics and a non-constant
mean over time (Kutty, 2010).
All variables are tested for unit roots using the Levin, Lin,
and Chu (2002), Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003) and Augmented
Dickey and Fuller (1979) tests for the individual intercept
equation. The results indicate that all variables are free of unit
roots. Table 5 outlines the selected results.
Table 5 indicates that the probability values of the results of
all tests have a statistical significance of 1%. Thus, no unit
roots are present in the variables used in this study.
This study aims to test the free cash flow hypothesis pro-
posed by Jensen (1986, 1993, 1989). According to this hy-
pothesis, paying out dividends to shareholders and/or raising
data ratios may reduce the agency cost arising from free cash
flow. Therefore, a negative correlation is anticipated between
FCF and the variables of LEV and DPS. In addition, a positive
correlation between FCF and SIZE is expected due to the
problem of overinvestment which result in increase in assets.
Table 6 outlines the results of the equation used to test the
abovementioned relationships. Since the data period covers the
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by excluding crises year from the sample. By doing so, it is
possible to see whether crisis has impact on estimation.
According to the model, covered whole period, outlined in
Table 6 and, 44% of FCF variability can be explained with
variability in DPS, LEVand SIZE (the control variable). The F-
statistic, which shows the overall statistical significance level of
the predicted model, has a significance of 1%. If the period
of the model is shorten by excluding crisis years, adjusted R2
increases up to 0.49 and F-statistics is still significant at 1%.
Table 6 also indicates a negative correlation between the
standardized FCF and the DPS and SIZE at the 1% signifi-
cance level in period of 2008e2014 and at the 5% significance
level in period of 2010e2014. According to the free cash flow
hypothesis, paying out dividends is a way to reduce the agency
cost of conflict of interest between shareholders and company
managers. The negative correlation between dividend payouts
and the amount of free cash flow under the control of man-
agers confirms the hypothesis in the Turkish context.
A negative correlation with a statistical significance of 1%
is found between FCF and LEV in both period of 2008e2014
and 2010e2014. This relationship is present between LEV and
FCF as well as LTLEV and FCF in whole period. The results
support the contention that free cash flow may cause managers
to invest in projects with negative NPVand this practice can be
mitigated with increased debt ratios in the Turkish context.
As expected, a positive correlation with a statistical sig-
nificance of 1% exists between FCF and SIZE in both period
of 2008e2014 and 2010e2014. According to the hypothesis,
managers make decisions in favor of increasing assets for their
own gain. At the same time, managers with their own interests
in mind expand assets by investing in projects with negative
NPV. For this reason, the significant positive correlation found
between free cash flow and total assets supports the free cash
flow hypothesis.
5. Conclusion
The free cash flow hypothesis argues that debt financing
and dividend payouts are necessary to keep free cash flow
under control and thus, align the interests of managers with
those of shareholders.
This study investigates whether the free cash flow hy-
pothesis is valid for companies traded on Borsa Istanbul using
the IFRS yearly nonconsolidated balance sheets and income
statements of 227 firms for the period 2008e2014. A panel
regression is used to test for a correlation between free cash
flow and the variables dividends per share, debt ratios and total
assets.
According to the results of the fixed effects panel regres-
sion, a statistically significant, negative, correlation exists
between free cash flow and debt ratio as well as free cash flow
and dividends per share. In addition, a significant positive
correlation is identified between total assets and free cash flow.
Even the crisis year 2008 and 2009 are excluded from our
sample, the results did not change significantly. The results
support the free cash flow hypothesis. As the hypothesissuggests, the distribution of dividends and debt financing
reduce free cash flow. In other words, firms with high dividend
distribution and high debt ratios have a lower amount of free
cash flow under the control of managers.
The results of this study may also shed light on the prac-
tices of regulatory bodies. The free cash flow hypothesis
suggests that dividend distribution and external financing
reduce the amount of free cash flow at the disposal of man-
agers. Therefore, regulatory bodies may encourage dividend
distribution in an effort to align the interests of managers with
those of shareholders, thereby reducing agency cost.
Future studies may investigate whether asignificant rela-
tionship exists between free cash flow and company perfor-
mance and/or company value.References
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